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<Abstract>
The total amount of government debt was expected to rise sharply over the following
several years in the wake of the Korean financial and economic crisis in 1997, raising
concern about the sustainability of government deficits and fiscal consolidation.  This
paper provides an overview of Korea’s fiscal stance after the financial crisis and the policy
implications for fiscal consolidation by assessing fiscal sustainability.  Sustainability
tests are carried out and show that Korean fiscal policy for the period 1970-99 should be
regarded as sustainable. Indicators of sustainability are also measured to that Korean fiscal
policy for the period 1970-96 is sustainable. However, both the primary and tax gap
indicators with a sharp rise in the debt ratios are shown to be worsening since 1997
indicating increasingly possible unsustainable fiscal policies.  It implies that the current
primary deficit is too large and current taxes are too low to stabilize the debt ratio.
1. Introduction
The total amount of government debt was expected to rise sharply over the following
several years in the wake of the financial and economic crisis in Korea, raising concern
about the sustainability of government deficits and fiscal consolidation.
Korea recorded a budget deficit of 18.8 trillion won in 1998, the biggest annual
shortfall since the Republic’s foundation in 1948, and 13 trillion won in the following year.
Accordingly the ratio of deficit to gross domestic product (GDP) rose to 4.2 percent and
2.7 percent respectively, the highest since 1981. Snowballing financial costs on the public
funds used for financial sector restructuring were a main factor raising the budget deficit.
This dramatically raised the nation's government debt by 29.3 percent to 90 trillion won in
1998 from 69.6 trillion won in 1997.  The surge was attributed to the issuance of a huge
sum in state bonds and borrowings from international funding agencies in order to raise
badly-needed funds for corporate and financial restructuring.
When state-guaranteed liabilities are included, the government debt snowballed by
96.1 percent to 162 trillion won in 1998 from 82.6 trillion won in 1997 (see Figure 1).
The government debt further expanded to 189.2 trillion won in 1999 and 194.2 trillion
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2won in 2000 respectively.  The ratio of government debt to the GDP rose from 18.1
percent in 1997 to 36.0 percent in 1998. The ratio climbed to 39.1 percent in 1999, but
declined to 37.6 percent in 2000.
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<Figure 1>  Budget Deficits and Governmentl Debt
%
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The skyrocketing amount of government debt is expected to pose a serious threat to
the nation's economic development.  Korea is worried that a dramatic rise in the
government debt will derail the sound economic growth as has been seen in other
countries, including the U.S., Britain, Germany and Japan.  Korea's debt ratio to the GDP
is still lower than those of some advanced economies most of which vary from 50 percent
to 70 percent.  However, government debt, once it begins to accumulate, tends to surge
continuously due to snowballing interest payment burdens.
Thus the main purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of Korea’s fiscal
stance for the last three decades and particularly after the financial crisis and the policy
implications for fiscal consolidation by assessing fiscal sustainability.  It summarizes the
general analytical background, focusing on the present value budget constraint (PVBC),
sustainability indicators and tests of sustainability.  Sustainability tests are carried out to
test the hypothesis that Korean fiscal policy for the period 1970-99 should be regarded as
sustainable.
However, the PVBC approach has clear limitations, that is, some fiscal policies that
in no obvious sense appear unsustainable can satisfy the PVBC, while some other fiscal
policies appear sustainable but do not satisfy the PVBC.  Therefore, indicators of
sustainability are measured to assess how far Korean fiscal policy departs from
sustainability.  It should be noted that such indicators are not backed by a formal
definition of sustainability.  Instead, they rely on a more intuitive notion of what
distinguishes sustainable from unsustainable fiscal policy.  These indicators would back
3up the result of hypothesis testing obtained by the PVBC as to whether Korean fiscal
policy for the period 1970-99 is sustainable.
2. The Theoretical Framework
This section presents a basic theoretical framework1 to discuss fiscal sustainability
which must satisfy both an intertemporal budget constraint and, in every period, a static
budget constraint. The static budget constraint is
Bt = (1+rt)Bt-1 + Dt                                                   (1)
where Bt is the government debt at period t, rt is the discount rate, and Dt is the primary
fiscal deficit, excluding interest payments.  Solving equation (1) forward yields the
intertemporal budget constraint
∞
Bt-1 = - å b
j+1 Dt+j + lim b
j+1 Bt+j                                        (2)
j=0        j→∞
where b  = 1/(1+r) and b j+1 is the discount factor applying between periods t and t+j.
From equation (2), sustainability requires that the present value of future primary
surpluses must exceed the present value of primary deficits by a sufficient amount to
cover the difference between the initial debt stock and the present value of the terminal
debt stock.
If the present value of the terminal debt stock is positive, equation (2) can be satisfied
even if a government rolls over its debt in full every period by borrowing to cover both
principal and interest payments.  However, Chalk and Hemming (2000) demonstrates
that a government attempting to run a Ponzi game will find that no rational individual is
willing to hold its liabilities, and it cannot therefore roll over its debt in full in every
period.
∞
Bt-1 = - å b
j+1 Dt+j                                                    (3)
j=0
Thus a no-Ponzi game restriction is typically regarded as synonymous with
sustainability, which implies that the transversality condition, lim b j+1 Bt+j < 0, has to hold.
In fact, this condition will hold as an equality since individual investors cannot end up
being indebted to the government, and as a consequence sustainable fiscal policy has to
satisfy the present value budget constraint (PVBC)
                                                
1 A closed-economy version is assumed, where there is no need to be concerned about
external debt.
4That is, sustainability requires that an excess of future primary surpluses over
primary deficits match the current stock of government debt in present value terms.
On the other hand, Barro (1989) and Kremers (1989) argue for a constraint on the
size of primary fiscal deficits and, because the government cannot raise more revenue than
the economy generates as income, the condition - Dt+j < gYt+j must hold, where Yt+j is
output and g < 1, which implies that
∞
Bt-1 < å b
j+1 gYt+j                                                    (4)
j=0
is the necessary condition for sustainability.  This would imply that, if the interest rate is
greater than the growth rate, the debt ratio needs to be bounded.
McCallum (1984) also points out, while permanent primary deficits are inconsistent
with the PVBC, permanent overall deficits, inclusive of interest payments, may be
sustainable.  This can be seen more clearly if one imagines a country running a small
primary surpluses every period to cover a fraction of the interest costs of the debt.  There
will be an overall deficit in every period, but the debt will grow less fast than the interest
rate and thus be regarded as sustainable, that is, satisfying the transversality condition.
3. Sustainability Tests2
We are now interested in the question of whether the Korean government’s creditors
could rationally expect that the government budget would be balanced in present-value
terms.  If the PVBC holds for historical data, then the null hypothesis
lim b j+1 Bt+j = 0                                                      (5)
will not be rejected in statistical tests.
The appropriate sustainability test is then to see if the historical process that generates
fiscal data is likely to result in the PVBC eventually being violated.3  If so, fiscal policy
and thus the data generating process will have to be changed and current policy should be
regarded as unsustainable.
                                                
2 There are quite a few studies that examine if the U.S. federal budget deficits violate
intertemporal budget balance. The results are contradictory. With the exceptions of
Hamilton and Fl vin (1986) and Wilcox (1989), most papers, including Trehan and Walsh
(1988), Hakkio and Rush (1991), and Bohn (1998), develop their tests by expoloiting the
presence, under intertemporal budget balance, of a cointegrating relationship linking
net-of-interest expenditures, revenues, interest payments, and the outstanding stock of
debt.
3 See Chalk and Hemming (2000) for further discussion.
5Equation (2) is mathematically equivalent to equation (6), the model proposed by
Flood and Garber (1980) for studying self-fulfilling hyperinflation and applied by
Hamilton and Flavin (1986).
Bt = A0(1+r)
t – Et å b
j+1 Dt+j + e t                                       (6)
where the operator Et denotes the expectations of creditors and t is a regression
disturbance term reflecting expected changes in real short-term interest rates, the term
structure of long rates, and measurement error.  Hamilton and Flavin suggest that, for any
stationary process for (e t, Et å b
j+1 Dt+j), when A0 = 0, Bt will be stationary, whereas for A0
> 0, Bt will not be stationary.  They also propose that the test to determine whether A0 = 0
is based on the observation that if the process for the discounted sum of future deficits is
stationary, then Bt is stationary if and only if A0  = 0.
4
<Table 1> Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test on Government Deficit and Debt
Variable Sample ADF Test Statistic Constant Lags
(1)  (1 - L)Dt
(2)  (1 - L)Dt
(3)  (1 - L)Bt
(4)  (1 - L)Bt
70-99
70-99
70-99
70-99
-1.91
-1.99**
-1.24
-2.29**
O
X
O
X
2
2
4
4
Note: * denotes significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. L denotes the lag operator
The annual data for 1970-99 is used to test whether the bubble term turns out not to
be zero, and the hypothesis that Korean fiscal policy should be regarded as sustainable.
The results from the augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests are contained in Table 1.
Equation (1) shows that the computed value of the ADF test statistic is too small to reject
the null hypothesis of a unit root in the budget deficit process at any level of significance.
However, since the estimate of the constant term is insignificant, results of the same
regression excluding the constant is presented in equation (2).  Now the presence of a
unit root in the deficit process is rejected at the significance level of 5 percent.  Equation
(3) produces the result for stock of debt process, showing that the null hypothesis of a unit
root in the debt process cannot be rejected at any level of significance.  Yet the exclusion
of the insignificant constant term in equation (4) shows that the presence of a unit root in
the stock of debt process is rejected at the significance level of 5 percent.
Similarly, the Phillips-Perron test results are presented in Table 2.  Equations (1)
and (2) repeat the same exercises for the deficit and debt processes.  In both cases, we
can reject the hypothesis of a unit root at the 5 percent level.
                                                
4 Hamilton and Fl vin also suggest that a sufficient condition for the PVBC to hold is that,
if the primary balance is a stationary series, A0 = 0 must imply that Bt i  also stationary.
It should be noted that this is a sufficient but not necessary condition for sustainability;
fiscal policy could be sustainable even if debt is nonstationary.
6<Table 2>  Phillips-Perron Test on Government Deficit and Debt
Variable Sample PP Test Statistic Constant
(1)  (1 - L)Dt
(2)  (1 - L)Bt
70-99
70-99
-1.78**
-2.52**
X
X
Note: * denotes significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
The test results show that both the budget deficit and the debt are stationary5, and
thus conclude that the bubble term turns out not to be significant, and the hypothesis that
Korean fiscal policy for the period 1970-99 should be regarded as sustainable cannot be
rejected.  The Korean data thus seem fully favorable so far with the assertion that
government creditors rationally expected the budget to be balanced in present-value terms
even if the budget deficit and the debt are skyrocketing after the economic crisis in 1997.
For Korea that had little debt or with significant net worth until the currency crisis, fiscal
policies may still be sustainable even if they lead to an increase in debt or lower net worth.
4. Indicators of Fiscal Sustainability
In this section, we focus on indicators of how far Korean fiscal policy departs from
sustainability in practice.  Even if the test results obtained in the previous section seem to
favor the PVBC approach, it has clear limitations.6  That is, most notably some fiscal
policies that in no obvious sense appear unsustainable can satisfy the PVBC while some
other fiscal policies appear sustainable but do not satisfy the PVBC.  In contrast,
indicators of sustainability have considerable intuitive appeal and distinguishes sustainable
from unsustainable fiscal policy. 7
Definition of Sustainable Indicators
The indicators attempt to assess the magnitude of inconsistencies in fiscal policies
and measure the size of the permanent fiscal adjustment needed to achieve stabilization of
                                                
5 Hamilton and Fl vin also show that the hypothesis that post war U.S. fiscal policy should
not be regarded as sustainable cannot be rejected since both the primary balance series
and the debt process are stationary. In contrast, Trehan and Walsh (1988, 1991) find
debt in the United States to be nonstati nary. However, they argue that if the PVBC
holds, if deficits and debt are integrated, and if interest rates are constant, then a
necessary and sufficient condition for sustainability is that primarybalances are and
debt are cointegrated. They find that cointegration is not rejected for p stwar U.S. ata.
6 See Buiter(1985), Blanchard(1990), Horne(1991), and Chalk and Hemming(2000) for
further discussion.
7 Even not backed by a formal definition and theoretical framework, sustainability
indicators are used by the OECD and the IMF to assess the sustainability of fiscal
policies of industrial countries for their usefulness.
7the base year national debt-to-GDP ratio.  Measure of fiscal sustainability are proposed
by Buiter (1985) that sustainable fiscal policy should maintain the ratio of government net
worth to output at its current level.  The sustainability indicator introduced by Buiter is
GNW = d* - d = (r - n)w – d                                            (7)
where d = the ratio of the primary deficit to GDP, d* = the ratio of the sustainable primary
deficit to GDP, r = real rate of interest, n = real growth rate of GDP, w = the ratio of net
worth to GDP.  A negative value suggests that the current primary deficit is too large to
stabilize the net worth ratio and that fiscal policy should thus be regarded as unsustainable.
Even if the net worth indicator is easy to interpret, it is difficult in general to obtain
accurate information on the magnitude of government net worth.  Easily measurable
indicators of fiscal sustainability are thus developed by Blanchard (1990) ; the primary
gap indicator and the tax gap indicator.
The primary gap indicator is based on the permanent primary deficit necessary to
stabilize the debt ratio and is given by
GP = d* - d = (n - r)b - d                                              (8)
where b = the ratio of government debt to GDP.  It measures the required adjustment in
the primary deficit needed to stabilize the government debt-to-GDP ratio, given the
current and projected paths of the primary balance, the real interest rate and output
growth. 8  That is, the primary gap equals the difference between the primary deficit that
stabilizes the outstanding debt-to-GDP ratio and the current primary fiscal deficit.  The
benchmark indicator is zero with a negative value for this indicator showing that the
current primary deficit is too large to stabilize the debt ratio and that fiscal policy is thus
unsustainable.
The tax gap indicator9 is given by
GT = t - t* = t + (n - r)b - g                                            (9)
where t = the ratio of taxes to GDP, t* = the ratio of sustainable taxes to GDP, g = the
ratio of primary government expenditures (excluding interest payments) to GDP.  The
tax gap indicator is the difference between the current tax ration and the constant tax ratio
and measures the required adjustment in the tax ratio needed to stabilize the outstanding
debt-to-GDP ratio, given the current and projected paths of the primary expenditures, the
real interest rate and output growth.  A negative value for the tax gap indicator suggests
that current taxes are too low to stabilize the debt ratio given the current fiscal policy.
Chalk and Hemming (2000) argue that the primary and tax gap indicator are
obviously the same, but they differ in their emphasis.  The former points to the reduction
in the primary deficit required for sustainability of the debt, while the latter indicates the
                                                
8 Horne (1991) shows that the primary gap is derived from the budget identity, assuming
no monetary financing and setting the change in debt stock equal to zero.
9 Blanchard (1990) also suggests a medium-term tax gap indicator, which is the difference
between the current tax ratio and that necessary to stabilize the debt ratio over the next
N years, assuming constant interest and growth rates.
8increase in the tax ratio required for sustainability of the debt given current spending
policies.  The main advantage of using sustainability indicators is that they are relatively
simple to construct, being model-free and based on forecasts of a restricted information set.
The indicators suggested here are also useful in that they are quite simple and have a ready
intuition that should appeal to policy decision-making.10
Simulation Results
Government debt ratios and sustainability indicators are not conceptually equivalent.
The former measures the actual or ex ante ratio of the outstanding stock of government
indebtedness to GDP while the latter are ex ante measures of the required permanent fiscal
adjustment needed to stabilize the base year government debt ratio.  However, simulation
of the net government debt-to-GDP ratio together with sustainability indicators would
provide a good proxy of government solvency.
<Table 3>  Correlation Coefficients, 1970-99
Net debt Primary gap Tax gap
Net debt
Primary gap
Tax gap
1.00
-0.11
-0.04
-0.11
1.00
0.85
-0.04
0.85
1.00
Table 3 shows the correlation coefficients between government debt ratios, primary
gap indicator, and tax gap indicator over the period, 1970-99, in Korea.  The coefficients
between debt ratios and primary gap indicator and between debt ratios and tax gap
indicator are negative while the magnitudes are very small.
Table 4 and Figure 2 show the net government debt-to-GDP ratio of the general
government of Korea together with the primary and tax gaps simulated over the period,
1970-99.  The most interesting finding is that the observed decline in debt ratios since the
early 1980s until the economic crisis 1997 gives a misleading picture of fiscal solvency by
failing to capture the rise in the indicators, while the debt ratios and indicators move
together for the rest of the sample period.  Particularly, it should be noted that as the debt
ratios rise sharply since 1997, both the primary and tax gap indicators are shown to be
worsening over the period in the wake of the economic crisis in Korea indicating
increasingly possible unsustainable fiscal policies.  That is, the current primary deficit is
too large and current taxes are too low to stabilize the debt ratio.
                                                
10 However, Horne discusses that there are three main areas of weakness of sustainability
indicators; lack of behavioural content, inclusion of implicit normative criteria and the
absence of a global or systematic perspective.
9<Table 4>  Government Debt and Sustainability Indicators        (unit: %)
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Net debt
Primary gap
Tax gap
12.6
-1.62
-3.89
14.5
-1.37
-3.48
18.8
-4.79
-7.17
18.2
-0.08
-2.97
19.3
5.73
-0.59
22.9
-0.13
0.05
21.5
2.37
0.93
20.9
0.83
0.15
19.4
2.90
1.62
16.8
1.02
-1.21
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Net debt
Primary gap
Tax gap
19.7
-2.39
-4.51
20.3
-1.56
-3.58
22.1
-1.30
-1.85
19.9
1.68
1.61
18.3
1.67
0.89
17.6
0.58
0.19
15.8
2.17
1.61
16.9
2.88
2.55
14.3
3.38
2.46
14.2
0.41
-1,36
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Net debt
Primary gap
Tax gap
13.7
1.47
0.75
12.8
-0.07
-0.53
12.6
0.01
-0.62
11.8
1.02
-0.03
10.6
1.30
3.15
9.4
1.53
0.25
8.8
0.35
-1.16
11.1
-0.49
-2.01
16.1
-4.06
-6.28
18.6
-2.38
-3.38
Sources: Calculated by the author. Raw data is obtained from the Ministry of Finance and Economy, Korea.
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<Figure 2>  Government Debt and Sustainability Indicators
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5. Conclusion and Policy Implications
This study provides an overview of Korea’s fiscal stance for the last three decades
and particularly after the financial crisis, and the policy implications for fiscal
consolidation by assessing fiscal sustainability.  It summarizes the general analytical
background, focusing on the present value budget constraint (PVBC), sustainability
indicators and tests of sustainability.  Sustainability tests are carried out and show that
Korean fiscal policy for the period 1970-99 should be regarded as sustainable.  The
primary gap and tax gap indicators would also back up the result of hypothesis testing
obtained by the PVBC that Korean fiscal policy for the period, particularly between 1970-
96, is sustainable.
However, both the primary and tax gap indicators with a sharp rise in the debt ratios are
shown to be worsening since 1997, indicating increasingly possible unsustainable fiscal policies.
This implies that the current primary deficit is too large and current taxes are too low to stabilize
the debt ratio.  Thus, increased tax collection and per capita tax burden are recommended to
reduce the government's budget deficits and debt and to consolidate the fiscal stance so as to retain
fiscal sustainability in Korea.
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